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Abstract
Major structural changes to the current fossil-fuel based economic system are needed in order to address the
climate change challenge. To this purpose, eective Renewable Energy Sources (RES) support policies, along
with concrete eorts towards the improvement of energy eciency, have been adopted in many countries.
One of these policies is the feed-in-tari (FiT) mechanism, according to which electricity produced by RES
is sold at guaranteed prices (feed-in taris), which are higher than market ones, for xed periods of time.
In this paper, we investigate how to foster a sustainability transition of the energy system towards an
economically and ecologically sustainable growth path by using an enriched version of the Eurace model.
Eurace has been enriched by including an energy sector where electricity is demanded by domestic producers
and is supplied by a fossil-fuel based power producer as well as a renewable-energy based one. Both power
producers undertake pricing and capacity investment decisions based on the price of imported fossil fuel and
feed-in tari government policy. In particular, we investigate how the economy is aected by the scal costs
of nancing the feed-in tari mechanism and by the benets of lower fossil fuels imports, in order to devise
the policy with the best cost-benet trade-o for the macroeconomy as a whole.
Results show that the feed-in-tari policy is eective in fostering the sustainability transition of the energy
sector and that it increases the level of investments in the economy with a slightly positive impact on the
unemployment rates. Moreover, we observe that its nancing costs do not impact government nances in a
relevant way. On the other hand, the higher level of investments occurs at the expense of the production
of consumption goods, therefore with a negative impact for the living standards, at least according to the
perspective of a consumerist society. However, if factors like better employment rates and the reduced GHG
emissions are also taken into account, along with consumption, by an appropriate preference function, the
nal outcome on well-being should be probably deemed as favourable.
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1. Introduction
Sustainability transitions are long-term, multi-dimensional, and fundamental transformation processes
that bring socio-technical systems to shift to more sustainable modes of production and consumption. Sus-
tainability challenges can be observed in several domains, for example, energy supply, water supply, sanitation
systems, transportation sector, agriculture and food system (Geels, 2011; Gil and Beckman, 2009; Gleick,
2003).
Focussing to the energy sector, major structural changes to the current fossil-fuel based economic systems
are needed in order to address the challenge of climate change and economic recovery (Zysman and Huberty,
2013). In this respect, the European Union, has displayed a series of documents to reach the greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission reduction level necessary for staying below the politically agreed limit of 2 degrees
temperature increase (European Commission, 2011a). The current EU roadmap is based on the so called
\20-20-20" target, i.e., a 20% reduction in GHG emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy in gross nal en-
ergy consumption and a 20% reduction in total primary energy consumption for EU, by year 2020 compared
to year 1990. In 2011, the European Commission dened the long-term GHG emission reduction target for
2050 as 80%-95% below 1990 levels in order to reach the global political goal of staying below a 2 degrees
temperature increase (see the "Energy Roadmap 2050", European Commission (2011a), and the "Roadmap
Towards a Competitive Low-carbon Economy Until 2050", European Commission (2011b)). Moreover, two
intermediate goals for 2030 have been dened in 2013: the reduction of 40% GHG emission and 27% share
of renewable energy with respect to 1990 levels, see European Commission (2013a,b). Finally, in 2015 the
critical role that nance needs to play in enabling the resource ecient and low carbon transition has been
discussed in Paris at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) organized by the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (McInerney and Johannsdottir, 2016; Johannsdottir and
McInerney, 2016).
These challenging goals will only be achieved with an eective Renewable Energy Sources (RES) support
policy and with a concrete eort towards the improvement of energy eciency. Within various renewable
energy technologies, Photovoltaic (PV) system has become one of the major actor in the electricity sector
in Europe, and dierent PV support measures have been introduced, for example capital subsidies, VAT
reduction, tax credits, quota obligation, net-metering and feed-in taris (FiTs) (IEA, 2015). Each support
mechanism oers both pro and cons for the producers and the collectivity. The most diuse PV support
policy is the Feed-In Tari (FiT) system that is considered the most eective policy in order to stimulate the
rapid development of RES (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Menanteau et al., 2003; Stern et al., 2006; Butler
and Neuho, 2008; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008).
According to the feed-in tari policy electricity produced by RES can be sold at guaranteed prices for
xed periods of time. These prices are generally guaranteed by the government in a non-discriminatory
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manner for every kWh of electricity produced, so that a large number of investors can participate, including
households, landowners, farmers, municipalities, and small business owners (Klein, 2008; Lipp, 2007).
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), based on computable general equilibrium, are the most common
models for the analysis of climate policy and physical and socio-economic eects of climate change (Pindyck,
2015). In a general equilibrium framework, where economies are considered as \static, unchanging and
perfectly ecient" (The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014), and the economic agents
optimize their individual state and neglect external eects, climate policies are introduced as an additional
constraint leading to less optimal (or ecient) outcomes. The overall economic costs (mainly in terms of
GDP) of climate and energy policies and how these costs can be shared, e.g. among the member states of
EU are the main important points of discussion about sustainability Wolf et al. (2016).
Therefore, the cost of climate mitigation can lead only to lower economic welfare, with no room for possible
long-term economic benet. The only possibility of not reducing welfare is if the models assume very large
damages in the future (in combination with lower discount rates).
Actually, the structural changes required to realize the transition to a low carbon economy are beyond the
horizon of standard climate policy analysis models, and thus are the potential benets from these changes.
In fact, the possibility that climate policy oers economic opportunities has been largely neglected in previ-
ous macroeconomic modeling. The economic state of the European Union, characterized by low investment
rates, low growth and high unemployment, however, suggests that there is an urgent need for new economic
opportunities. To explore such opportunities, Burke et al. (2016) outline the need of research progress on
climate economics, and in particular on rening the social cost of carbon (SCC), improving understanding of
the consequences of particular policies and better understanding of the economic impacts and policy choices
in developing economies.
The need of new approaches and tools based on complex system and network analysis has been advocated by
(Battiston et al., 2016; Farmer et al., 2015; Rezai and Stagl, 2016). Agent-based modelling (ABM), already
employed for the study of complex systems, such as nancial markets (Farmer et al., 2005; Ponta et al.,
2011b; Pastore et al., 2010; Ponta et al., 2011a, 2012) and economic systems (Raberto et al., 2008; Dosi
et al., 2010; Raberto et al., 2012; Caiani et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016), is an alternative approach able
to address shortcomings of IAMs because it provides a way for addressing out-of-equilibrium dynamics in
economic systems (Farmer et al., 2015).
In particular, while general equilibrium models are characterized by rational and optimizing representative
agents and by equilibrium solutions subject to exogenous shocks, agent-based models are characterized by
a large number of heterogenous and interacting agents, endowed with adaptive expectations, and by the
ensuing evolutionary macroeconomic dynamics emerging from those endogenous interactions. Therefore,
this modelling framework is more suitable to investigate the transition to a sustainable low carbon economy,
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because ABM allows the study of the sustainability transition not as an equilibrium suboptimal solution but
as a possible dynamic path emerging from the appropriate coordination of the endogenous interactions and
decisions of dierent economic agents characterized by limited rationality and information.
A detailed review of the literature on complex systems, related to the climate issues, with particular attention
to ABM, is provided in Balint et al. (2016), where the authors identify dierent areas where accounting for
heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium dynamics provides a complementary and novel perspective to
the one of standard equilibrium models. Furthermore, other tools that consider out-of-equilibrium dynamics
in economic systems, have been applied in order to investigate the climate change and relative economic
policies. In Safarzyska and van den Bergh (2016), the authors propose a formal behavioral-evolutionary
macroeconomic model populated by heterogeneous consumers, producers, power plants and banks, interact-
ing through interconnected networks, and examine how decisions by all these economic agents aect nancial
stability, the direction of technological change and energy use. In Rengs et al. (2015), the authors propose
a macroeconomic multi-agent model with agents that change the behavior associated with carbon-intensive
goods to test the eect of various policies on both environmental and economic performance. In Monasterolo
and Raberto (2016), the authors propose the IRIN System Dynamics model with heterogeneous agents as
a tool to simulate green scal and targeted monetary policies, displaying their eects on rms' investments,
unemployment, wages, credit market and economic growth. Also in Jackson and Victor (2015), the authors
develop a system dynamics macro-economic model for describing nancial assets and liabilities in a stock-
ow consistent Framework (FALSTAFF) and use this model to explore the potential for stationary state
outcomes in an economy with balanced trade, credit creation by banks, and private equity. Then, this model
has been enriched developing a socio-economic sustainability transition in order to analyze the economic,
ecological and nancial aspects (Jackson et al., 2015).
In this paper, we address the question on how to foster the rebuilding of the energy system with the aim
of reaching a low carbon economy, and whether rebuilding the energy system has the potential to trigger a
sustainability transition towards an economically and ecologically sustainable growth path. In this respect,
abstracting from the obvious improvements in GHG emissions, we aim to assess the trade-o between the
scal economic costs of nancing a transition to a renewable and fossil-fuels free energy system and the
benets of reducing substantially fossil fuels imports, in particular in the long term. Our goal is to devise
the better policy combination that improves the long-term benets with respect to the short-term costs
for the macroeconomy as a whole. In order to investigate the macroeconomic eects of the sustainability
transition in the energy sector, we employ and enrich the agent-based macroeconomic model and simulator
Eurace as it will be outlined in the following section (Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012a,b; Raberto et al., 2012;
Teglio et al., 2012; Raberto et al., 2014; Teglio et al., 2015).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the main enrichments made to the Eurace model in
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order to address the issue of the sustainability transition in the energy sector, Section 3 shows the results of
the computational experiments and, nally, Section 4 provides our concluding remarks.
2. Modeling the sustainability transition in Eurace
2.1. Overview of the Eurace model
The model presented in this paper is an enrichment of the macroeconomic agent-based simulator Eurace
(Cincotti et al., 2010, 2012a,b; Raberto et al., 2012; Teglio et al., 2012; Raberto et al., 2014; Teglio et al.,
2015). Eurace originally included the following agents: households (HHs), acting as workers, consumers
and nancial investors; consumption goods producers (CGPs), which are rms producing a homogenous
consumption good; a capital goods producer (KGP), commercial banks (Bs) and two policy makers, namely
a government (G) and a central bank (CB), in charge of scal and monetary policy, respectively. A detailed
description of agents behaviour and interactions in the dierent markets is provided in (Teglio et al., 2015).
To address the issue of the sustainability transition in the energy sector, the following agents have been
included now in the model: a fossil-fuels based electricity company, which imports fossil fuels and produces
electricity with decreasing returns to scale, a renewable-source based (e.g. solar or wind power) electricity
producer, which invests in renewable technology subject to government sustainability policy, and a fossil-
fuels exporting foreign economy.
The new agents interact on a monthly basis with the original agents through the (newly introduced) electricity
market.
A complete and compact description of all Eurace agents and sectors is provided in the Appendix by
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5, where we have highlighted the 'stock-ow consistency of the model, according to the
methodology described by (Godley and Lavoie, 2012) and along the lines of post-Keynesian economics, see
(Caverzasi and Godin, 2015). The tables highlight a set of relevant identities that need to be taken into
account to check for the consistency between stocks and ows in the simulated data.
2.2. New features: the energy sector
In order to investigate how to foster the sustainability transition in the energy sector, a feed-in-tari
system is considered. A feed-in tari mechanism is a policy mechanism designed to accelerate investment
in renewable energy technologies (Couture and Gagnon, 2010). The feed-in-tari system usually has three
components:
 a xed price for a xed amount of years (long-term contract),
 grid priority to electricity produced by renewable energy (meaning renewable energy will be bought
rst),
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 nancing costs covered by a mix of a reallocation charge E , paid only by electricity consumers, and
general taxation.
The feed-in tari mechanism is modelled in Eurace in a similar way. In particular, we postulate that
the renewable energy producer is entitled to sell electricity at a feed-in tari prE , assumed constant and
guaranteed forever by the government. The value prE is set exogenously and is the parameter characterizing
our experiments. The dierence between the feed-in-tari price prE and the market electricity price pE , paid
by electricity consumers, is paid by the government by using its general tax revenues1.
Two types of electricity producers, i.e. a fossil-fuel based one, henceforth PP, and a renewable-source based
one, henceforth RP, have been included, along with a fossil-fuels exporting foreign country, henceforth for-
eign economy (FE). In particular, the renewable electricity producer uses renewable technology, say solar
panels or wind turbines, to produce electricity that will be sold to electricity consumers (rms), whereas the
non-renewable electricity producer employs fossil fuel imported from the foreign economy to produce the
residual demanded quantity, as we assume that renewable energy has priority in the market.
Both PP and PP are characterized by a balance sheet, described in Table 2, in the same way of the other
agents. In particular, both PP and RP are characterized by liquidity M in the assets side and by equity E
in the liabilities side. Moreover, the RP is also characterized by a capital endowment, say the number of
solar panels (or wind turbines) installed, nsp, in the assets side and by debt D in the liabilities side. As the
solar panels (or wind turbines) are identied as capital goods in the model, they are produced domestically
by the capital goods producer that employs labor force as production factor.
2.2.1. Electricity demand
Electricity is demanded by consumption goods producers (CGPs) on a monthly basis. Firms need electric-
ity as it is a non-substitutable production factor, in addition to labor and capital, that any rm f employs
to produce the monthly amount of output qCf . To this purpose, we consider now a production function
characterized by a nested Cobb-Douglas and Leontief technology where the usual Cobb-Douglas production
function, characterized by labor N and capital K inputs (see Eq. 8 of Teglio et al. (2015)), is coupled with
a third non-substitutable input, i.e. the amount of electricity qEf , as follows:
qCf = min(N

f K

f ; EqEf ) ; (1)
where E is the electricity eciency parameter (supposed uniform across rms), which gives the amount of
output per unit of electricity.
1In order to investigate the system behaviour at high feed-in taris (relative to the electricity market price) and then huge
nancing costs, our experiments have been designed with E set to zero, then considering feed-in tari costs always fully nanced
by general taxation, to better distribute the burden on a broader scal base and then avoid too high electricity surcharges.
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We assume that electricity is immediately delivered to CGPs by one of the two electricity producers and
that rms are never rationed in their demand for electricity. Electricity demand (and consumption) qEf is
then given for any rm f by its output qCf as follows:
qEf =
qCf
E
: (2)
Aggregate demand (and consumption) of electricity is then given by
P
f qEf .
2.2.2. Renewable power producer (RP)
The Renewable Power Producer (RP) produces electricity using renewable energy sources, which from
now on we will call solar energy. For this purpose, the RP employs solar panels, built and sold by the capital
goods producer (KGP). The level of production of renewable electricity depends on the number of solar
panels installed, nsp, as follows:
qERP = qEspnsp ; (3)
where qEsp is the amount electricity supplied on a monthly basis by any single solar panel. The number of
installed solar panels is the cumulative result of monthly investment decision, nsp, made by the renewable
producer RP. The investment decision is based on a Net Present Value (NPV) calculation, which assesses
if the (discounted) expected future cash ows given by the additional electricity sales are larger than the
initial investment cost in the solar panel infrastructure, i.e.,
NPV (nsp) =  pspnsp +
1X
m=1
prEqE;spnsp
(1 + r=12)m
(4)
where psp is the price of a single solar panel, r is the yearly average cost of capital for the RP and m
represents the index of months. Assuming prE constant over time, considering that qe;spnsp is constant as
well (we assume that solar panels are not subject to wear), and using the well-known properties of geometric
series, Eq.(4) can be written as:
NPV (nsp) =  pspnsp +
prEqEspnsp
r=12
: (5)
Eq.(4) points out that, given the costs of solar panels, the expected revenues from selling the electricity at
the feed-in-tari price prE determine if the NPV is positive or negative, then if an investment to acquire
additional solar panels should be made. If NPV is positive, the investment is undertaken and new solar
panels are purchased from the capital goods producer. However, it is worth noting that, as the NPV increases
linearly and monotonically with nsp, the size of investments should be as large as possible according to
Eq.(4). Therefore, we postulate that the size of investment nsp depends on the liquidity available to the
renewable power producer.
Investment in new solar panels, nancing of investment and then production of electricity occur sequen-
tially, during the same day at the beginning of each month. New solar panels are immediately delivered to
the RP agent by the KGP and employed for the production of electricity.
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Table 2 presents the balance sheet of the RP agent. All balance-sheet entries are updated on a monthly
basis. In particular, liquidity MRP is updated according to RP' cash ows2, i.e., investment cost, electricity
sales and interests on debt; physical capital is given by the number nsp of solar panels installed and is
updated following new acquisitions; the change of debt level Drp depends on the borrowing of new loans and
repayment of old loans, whereas equity ERP (net worth) is calculated as a residual according to the usual
accounting rule:
ERP =MRP + nsppsp  DRP (6)
where psp is the monthly price of solar panels. We assume that the RP equity capital is divided equally
among households; however, the agent does not pay out dividends and retains all its earnings in order to
increase the liquidity available for future investments
2.2.3. Power producer (PP)
The power producer (PP) agent produces electricity using a non-renewable energy source, say oil, ac-
cording to a production function characterized by decreasing returns to scale3, as follows:
qEPP = E q
E
O with E < 1; (7)
where E and E are positive parameters and qO is the oil input amount. The PP buys oil abroad, i.e. from
a representative agent of a foreign economy, say Foreign Economy (FE) agent.
As we assume that the RP has priority in the power grid, the quantity of electricity qEPP that the PP will
sell during the month is set by the electricity market agent as a residual between the aggregate demand of
electricity,
P
f qEf , and the supply provided by the RP, qERP , i.e.,
qEPP =
X
f
qEf   qERP : (8)
It is worth noting that the aggregate demand of electricity,
P
f qEf , is unknown at the beginning of the
month because electricity is demanded by rms at their activation day, i.e. the day of production planning
and execution, which are dierent across rms, see Teglio et al. (2015) for further details. However, at the
beginning of each month the PP agent has to set the electricity price pE that will be valid for the rest of
the month and will be taken into account by rms for their production planning cost assessment. To this
purpose, as the price of electricity pE is set by the PP according to a mark-up on unit costs, the power
producer needs to estimate in advance, its incoming month production/sales, say bqEPP , and related unit
2It is worth noting that the RP agent has no direct electricity production costs whereas negative cash ows are given only
by investment costs and services of debt
3Production technology is characterized by decreasing returns to scale to mimic the upward-sloping supply curve made by
the aggregation of dierent producers with increasing unit costs in a competitive market
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costs bcE . The estimate is based on the electricity sold in the previous month increased by 10 %, so to take
into account a possible demand increase.
Given the estimate bqEPP and the production technology set by Eq 7, the quantity of oil bqO that would
be necessary to meet the production plan is given by
bqO = bqEPP
E
(1=E)
: (9)
Then, the PP, estimates the unit costs bcE that are equal to
bcE = pObqObqEPP = pObq
(1=E 1)
EPP

1=E
E
; (10)
where pO is the oil price set by the foreign economy. Accordingly, the PP sets the electricity price pE as:
pE = (1 + E)(1 + E)bcE (11)
where E is a xed markup and E is the reallocation charge, whose value depends on the policy adopted.
It is worth noting that the unit cost, and therefore the price, increases with the estimated electricity pro-
duction/sales bqEPP because 1=E   1 > 0.
The revenues of the PP are evaluated at the end of each month by summing up the eective quantity
of electricity sold during the month at the market price pE . Costs are given by the eective amount of oil
imported paid at price pO. Prots, if positive, are paid out to shareholders as dividends. Table 2 presents
the balance sheet of the PP. Liquidity MPP is updated monthly following PP cash ows.. Equity EPP is
also updated once a month at the beginning of the month according to the usual accounting rule.
2.2.4. Foreign Economy
The Foreign Economy (FE) is a stylized agent that works as provider of the oil that the PP needs in order
to produce electricity. The FE sets the oil price and receives the oil export payments which are accumulated
as liquidity. The FE balance sheet is simply characterized by a liquidity entry on the asset side and the
corresponding net worth (Equity) on the liabilities side.
2.2.5. Calibration
The monthly electricity qE;sp supplied by a single solar panel as well as its unit cost psp have been
calibrated to values consistent with the size of the other Eurace economic variables, considering real solar
panel costs and performance. The average cost (including installation) of a solar panel of power 1 kW has
been reported4 to be around 5000 e, whereas, at the present state of the art of technology, its average
monthly performance could be approximated to 100 kWh.
4http://www.ecoage.it/mappa-solare-italia.htm
9
In order to put the above numbers in the context of Eurace, we devised a sort of equivalence between the
Euro (e) and the currency unit used in Eurace, let's call the Eurace e(Ee). For this purpose, considering
that in Italy there are around 30 millions of families (households) with a net monthly labor income at around
1500 Euro per family, and that the computational experiments have been performed with 3000 households
with an initial money wage set to 1.5 Ee, the equivalence between the euro and the Eurace euro has been
obtained by equating the aggregate labor income of households in Italy and Eurace, that is
3 103  1:5Ee = 3107  1500e ; (12)
that gives
1Ee = 107e : (13)
In our model design, solar panels are identied with the capital goods units, whose initial unit cost is set
to 1 Ee; therefore, we need to characterize the Eurace solar panel with a monthly performance consistent
with its high initial cost, i.e. 10 million Euro, as stated by Eq. (13). As a real solar panel, characterized
by 1 kW of power and a monthly performance of 100 kW, is valued at around 5000 e, we assume that the
Eurace solar panel is equivalent to 2000 real solar panel and, accordingly, is characterized by a power 2 MW
and a monthly performance qsp = 200 MWh, i.e. 0.2 GWh. Moreover, it is worth noting that, as we identify
solar panels with regular capital goods, the equivalence between the price of an Eurace solar panel unit (psp)
and the price of capital goods pK , will hold for the entire duration of the simulation.
Furthermore, we have set electricity demand and market prices similar to the one observed in a reference
country, say Italy. According to Terna5, the monthly electricity consumption of the Italian industrial sector
is around 10,000 GWh; therefore, considering that, with the parameters used for the production sector, see
(Teglio et al., 2015), the monthly aggregate production capacity of 50 CGPs in Eurace is around 10,000 units
of consumption goods (u.c.g.), then according to Eq. (2), the electricity eciency E of each CGP has been
set to 1.0 u.c.g. / GWh.
According to GME6, the order of magnitude of the electricity market price is tens of /MWh, i.e. centimes of
E/GWh; therefore, according to Eqs. (6) -(10), we have set the electricity production function parameters,
E and E , as well as the price of oil, here assumed constant and equal to 0.0035 E, to values consistent
with the monthly electricity production of 10,000 GWh at a unit cost around 0.01 E/GWh.
Finally, it is worth noting that with the calibration here described, the oil bill of the economy is set to be
of the order of 1% of GDP, see Figure 8c, then consistent with the ratio observed in the reference country
considered7.
5http://www.terna.it/default/Home/SISTEMA_ELETTRICO/statistiche/consumi_settore_merceologico.aspx
6https://www.mercatoelettrico.org/it/
7"Foreign trade and import prices", April 2016, ISTAT
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Table 1: Relevant parameters values used in the simulation
symbol Parameter value
E electricity eciency 1.0 u.c.g./GWh
prE feed-in-tari [0.09-0.5] Ee
qE;sp quantity of electricity produced by a single solar panel 0.2 GWh
kE electricity eciency coecient 1.0
E electricity production exponent 0.9
pO oil price 0.0035 Ee
E markup 10%
E reallocation charge 0.0
3. Computational results
The methodology of the study is based on Monte Carlo computational experiments, consisting in running
simulations with dierent seeds of the pseudorandom number generator for each scenario. Six feed-in tari
electricity price scenarios, and 50 seeds per scenario, for a total of 300 simulations have been considered.
Simulations have been performed ceteris paribus, meaning that all the parameters are identical across the
dierent policy scenarios, with the exception of the feed-in tari, i.e. prE , whose value characterizes the
policy rule of a specic scenario. In particular, the feed-in tari price is taken as an exogenous parameter
that assumes six values, i.e. 0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. The value 0.09 has been veried to be close to
the threshold under which, given the NPV investment rule and the order of magnitude of the parameters
and the variables of the system, there are only negligible investments in new solar panels.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values related to the newly introduced energy sector. The parameters
values of the original Eurace model can be retrieved in Teglio et al. (2015), whereas in Ozel et al. (2016) one
can nd the housing market parameters. Simulations cover a ctitious time span of twenty years.
The Figures from 1 to 6 present a series of boxplots showing, for every value of the feed-in tari considered,
the distribution of several relevant economic variables over the 50 seeds used to initialize the pseudo-random
number generator. In particular, the values reported in the boxplots are the time averages, over the entire
20 years long time span, related to any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
Figure 1 shows that the feed-in tari policy adopted is very eective to spur investments in renewable energy
production capacity. This result is clearly evident when one observes how the distribution of the number
of installed solar panels and, correspondingly, of renewable energy production capacity (as a percentage of
total production), change with respect to the feed-in price value. In particular, we can observe how both the
median value (red line) and the mean (blue diamond) of the distribution clearly increase with the feed-in
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Figure 1: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari, prE , considered,
the distribution of the number of solar panels installed, nsp (a), the share of renewable energy (b), the
monthly electricity market price, pE (c) and the general tax rate (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation.
The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over the entire 20 years long
simulation related to any of the 50 seeds.
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tari, whereas the relative position of the box edges, which delimitate the 25th and 75th percentiles, indicates
a clear dierence between the outcomes related to two consecutive feed-in tari values considered. Panel (c)
of Figure 1 shows how the policy aects the distribution of electricity market prices, whose values decrease
for high values of the feed-in tari prE . This happens because higher feed-in taris lead to more renewable
capacity and consequently less electricity produced by means of fossil fuels, which in turn implies lower unit
costs/market price for electricity due to the decreasing returns to scale of power production based on fossil
fuels. Finally, panel d of Figure 1 reports the distribution of average tax rates. It is worth remembering that
the government budget nances the dierence between the revenues of the RP agent, which are based on
the feed-in tari prE , and the amount paid by electricity consumers, which is evaluated at the market price
pE , where pE < p
r
E . Therefore, it is important to investigate how scal policy (tax rates), which is stick to
the usual 3 % decit targeting rule, is aected by the additional feed-in tari nancing costs. Panel d shows
that there is some impact on average tax rates at the highest considered values of prE , but that the impact is
limited, in particular if we consider the median value which increases only for the maximum value assumed
by prE .
Figures from 2 to 5 aim to assess the impact of the feed-in tari policy on the real economy and in particular
on the labor, consumption goods and capital goods markets. For this purpose, we employ again the boxplot
representation to show how the distribution over 50 seeds of the time averages of relevant economic variables
changes with respect to the feed-in tari. In particular, we consider the employment rates, real consumption
and investment levels, and prices. Figure 2 shows that high feed-in taris have a clear impact on the
employment rate in the capital goods production sector (panel b). In particular, we observe that a larger
demand for solar panels, due to higher prE , determines higher employment rates at the solar panel supplier,
i.e., the capital goods producer (KGP). This is not a surprising outcome, indeed, but it is worth to point out
that the supply of more solar panels creates a sort of crowding out eect on the labour market as it can be
observed that, while the employment rate at the KGP agent increases, the employments rate at the CGPs
decreases (panel a).
On the other hand, this sort of crowding out eect of solar panel production has a very moderate negative
impact on the capital accumulation of rms, whose capital endowment seems meaningful lower only for the
highest value of prE , see Figure 5(a) and (b). However, the lower employment rates in the consumption good
sector, combined with an equal or lower capital base, clearly diminish the supply of consumption goods in
the economy. Finally, the total eect in the labour market, is a slight reduction of the total unemployment
rate (panel c) and then an increase of the nominal wage level (panel d) because of the higher pressure8 on
the labor market. Higher wages imply higher general unit production costs and then higher prices both for
8If rms have diculties in increasing the labor force, then they raise their wage oer. A detailed description of the labor
market in Eurace is provided in Dawid et al. (2014)
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Figure 2: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the employment rate in the consumption goods sector (a), the employment rate in the
investment good sector (b), the unemployment rate (c) and the nominal wage level (d) over the 50 seeds of
the simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over the entire
20 years long simulation related to any of the 50 seeds.
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consumption and capital goods, as observed accordingly in Figure 3. However, unit costs of CGPs depend
also on capital goods prices as well as on interest rates, which increase at high prE , see Figure 6, then
consumption goods prices increase more than nominal wages, as we can gure out by comparing Figure 2(d)
with Figure 3(a), with the result that real wages decrease when the feed-in tari increases. Therefore,
higher consumption goods prices, lower real wages as well as lower supply capacity by the CGPs explain
lower consumption levels in the economy. Figure 4 shows the substitution eect between investment and
consumption both in terms of average yearly levels (panel a and b) and in terms of average yearly growth
rates (panel c and d).
Figure 6 shows how high feed-in taris impact interest rates and government nances. The central bank
average interest rate increases at higher prE due to the Taylor-rule response to higher consumption goods
prices, shown in Figure 3 panel (a) and (c), whereas government nances are aected by the increasing
nancing costs, see Figure 7, panel (a) and (b), of the feed-in tari policy. Figure 6 shows that the higher
the nancing costs, the larger are decit (panel c) and debt (panel d) to GDP ratios, yet the negative impact
is limited and not particularly relevant. On the contrary, the value of the feed-in tari seems to have a more
important impact on the government bond yields. We argue that the impact on bond yields depends both
on the larger amount of government debt to be nanced and on the higher central bank interest rate for
high prE ; the rst factor implies a higher supply of government bonds in the market, whereas the second one
implies that the government bond yields need to increase to make debt instruments preferable as much as
liquidity.
Figure 7 reports the boxplots related to the feed-in tari policy costs with respect to both the nominal
GDP (panel a) and the tax revenues (panel b) as well as the oil import costs (panel c) and the overall costs of
electricity consumption (panel d), both with respect to nominal GDP. The feed-in tari policy cost, relative
to GDP, clearly increases exponentially with prE in line with the benets we observe in panel (a) and (b)
of Figure 1; while the cost to GDP of oil import and electricity decrease at high feed-in taris consistently
with the evidence observed in Figure 1 concerning the decrease of the share of non-renewable electricity
production (panel b) and of electricity market price (panel c). It is worth noting that, with the present
calibration, the order of magnitude of oil import costs (panel c) is much lower than the nancing costs of
the feed-in tari policy, being both costs reported with respect to nominal GDP; therefore, the economic
benets (lower imports) of the sustainability transition are lower than its nancing costs.
Figures from 8 to 10 present three trajectories over time of relevant variables. This dierent representation is
aimed to provide an understanding of dynamics over time of the Eurace economy. All the three trajectories
have been simulated by using the same seed and refer to three dierent scenarios according to the value of
prE , i.e. 0.09 (black-dashed line), 0.3 (blue-dotted line), and 0.5 (green-continuous line). We can observe
that the dynamics of the share of renewable energy production capacity, reported in panel (b) of Figure
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Figure 3: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the consumption goods price level, pC (a), the capital good price level, pK (b), the yearly
growth rate of the consumption goods price (c) and the yearly growth rate of the capital good price (d) over
the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages
over the entire 20 years long simulation related to any of the 50 seeds.
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Figure 4: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the real consumption level (a), the real investment level (b), the real consumption yearly
growth rate (c) and the real investment yearly growth rate (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The
values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over the entire 20 years long simulation
related to any of the 50 seeds.
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Figure 5: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the rms' aggregate capital stock, KF (a), the rms' aggregate capital stock yearly growth
rate (b), the rms' aggregate debt, DF (c) and the yearly growth rate of the rms' aggregate debt (d) over
the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages
over the entire 20 years long simulation related to any of the 50 seeds.
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Figure 6: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the CB policy rate (a), the government bond yield (b), both on a yearly basis, the
government debt to GDP (c) and the government budget to GDP (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation.
The values in the range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over the entire 20 years long
simulation related to any of the 50 seeds.
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Figure 7: The Figures present a series of boxplots showing, for any value of the feed-in tari prE considered,
the distribution of the cost of the feed-in-tari mechanism to GDP (a), to tax revenues (b), oil import costs
to GDP (c) and electricity cost of rm to GDP (d) over the 50 seeds of the simulation. The values in the
range represented by the boxplots refer to time averages over the entire 20 years long simulation related to
any of the 50 seeds.
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8, is characterized by both big jumps and a relatively steady growth. In particular, accordingly with the
investment decision rule based on the NPV, see Equation 4, jumps occur whenever interest rates, reported
in panel (d) of Figure 10, are very low or close to zero, see e.g. years 9 and 13 in the blue dotted-line
scenario and years 9, 15, 19 in the green continuous-line one. Concerning economic variables, we observe
an increasing dierence between the three scenarios, in particular in the second half of the simulation time
span, i.e. when the dierence in the renewable production capacity becomes relevant. The black dashed-line
scenario is aected by a severe endogenous crisis around year 11, see the unemployment rate (Figure 9a)
and consumption (Figures 10d,10b), that causes a huge reduction of investments. The crisis in the black
dashed-line scenario is so severe that causes a drop even in the productive capital stock of rms, because
of a very low investment rate combined with the bankruptcy of many rms that stay out of production for
months. This crisis has also the eect of cooling down the dynamics of all relevant prices, i.e. nominal
wage (Figure 9b), consumption and capital goods prices (Figures 10a and 10c). On the contrary, in the
green continuous-line scenario investments are generally maintained at higher rates, certainly also because of
solar panel production, that helps to keep the economy in good shape avoiding a prolonged unemployment
crisis from year 11 to 16, as in the black dashed-line scenario. Lower unemployment on average in the green
continuous-line scenario is the cause of steeper nominal wage dynamics in the second half of the simulation
time span (Figure 9b) and, being wages the most relevant costs for both capital and consumption goods
producers, this in turn is the cause of a higher increase of capital and consumption goods prices in the green
scenario (Figure 10a and 10c)). Finally, Figure 10 shows the long-run trade-o between the production of
investment goods (panel b), partly characterized by solar panels, and the one of consumption goods (panel
d), already observed in the previous box plots, see Figure 4. Moreover, Figure 9c, shows that investments
in renewable production capacity occurs to some extent also at the expense of capital accumulation in the
economy among consumption goods producers, as the capital endowment of rms in the green continuous-
line scenario is constantly lower than in the black dashed-line case and very similar to the blue dotted-line
scenario.
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Figure 8: The gures show the number of solar panels installed (a), the share of the renewable energy (b), the oil
amount consumed monthly by the PP (c) and the tax rate (d) during the entire 20 years long simulation. The 3
dierent colours correspond to the 3 values of the guaranteed electricity price prE . In particular the black, blue, green
lines represent prE = 0:09; 0:3; 0:5, respectively.
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Figure 9: The gures show the unemployment rate (%) (a), the average nominal wage level (b), the rms' aggregate
capital stock (c) and the CB policy rate (%) (d) during the entire 20 years long simulation. The 3 dierent colours
correspond to the 3 values of the guaranteed electricity price prE . In particular the black, blue, green lines represent
prE = 0:09; 0:3; 0:5, respectively.
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Figure 10: The gures show the capital good price (a), the real investment (b), the consumption goods price (c)
and the real consumption (d) during the entire 20 years long simulation. The 3 dierent colours correspond to the 3
values of the guaranteed electricity price prE . In particular the black, blue, green lines represent p
r
E = 0:09; 0:3; 0:5,
respectively.
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4. Concluding remarks
This study presented a set of computational experiments based on the Eurace agent-based macroeconomic
model and simulator. The Eurace model has been enriched with new features to allow the investigation of
the transition towards a sustainable energy production paradigm. The work focuses on a policy proposal
aimed to foster the transformation of the present economic system, where energy production is mainly based
on fossil-fuels, to an alternative one based on renewable energy. In particular, we study the eectiveness
and the impact on the economy of a feed-in tari policy aiming at incentivizing the production of energy by
means of a renewable source, e.g. solar energy. In this perspective, a new energy sector has been designed
into the Eurace model, by including an electricity market, power producers (renewable and fossil-fuel based)
and a more complete version of the capital goods producer, which employs labour force to produce both
investment goods for rms and solar panels for the renewable power producer.
Computational results clearly show a signicant impact of the feed-in-tari mechanism, which successfully
incentivizes the production of solar panels and increases the share of renewable energy consumed in the Eurace
economy. Furthermore, the costs of nancing the transition to renewable energy does not seriously aect
neither the economic performance, if measured by unemployment rates, which actually slightly reduce, nor
government nances, which are only moderately aected. This is an important and positive result that was
not obvious a priori, also considering that the scal costs of the policy result to be much higher than the
economic benets of lower fossil fuel import costs for the economy, according to a realistic calibration based
on the present fossil fuels import bill of an advanced economy.
On the other hand, we observe that, the stronger the feed-in tari policy is, the higher is the weight of
the investment sector in the economy, due to the needed production of renewable energy technology, at the
expenses of the production of consumption goods. This important outcome implies a reduced purchasing
power of consumption goods by households, and then lower living standards, if measured only according to
the perspective of a consumerist society. However, if factors like better employment rates and the reduced
GHG emissions are also taken into account, along with consumption, by an appropriate preference function,
the nal outcome on well-being should be probably deemed as favourable.
Future research will investigate and compare dierent policy options for the nancing of the feed-in
tari mechanism, with particular attention to the issuing of green bonds and the adoption of targeted
unconventional monetary policies, such as the green quantitative easing.
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Appendix
This appendix provides a compact model description that emphasizes the adopted stock-ow-consistent
modelling approach along the lines introduced by Godley and Lavoie (2012) and common also within post-
Keynesian economics, see also Caverzasi and Godin (2015). The following tables outline the stocks (balance
sheet entries) and ows (income statement entries) characterizing Eurace agents. A detailed description of
agents behavioural rules in the production and consumption sectors is reported in Teglio et al. (2015), whereas
Ozel et al. (2016) describes the structural and behavioural features of the housing market. Finally, it is worth
noting that the stock-ow-consistent modelling approach provides a set of relevant theoretical identities at the
agent, sector, and aggregate level, whose subsistence need to be numerically veried during the simulation,
thus providing a very important diagnostic and validation tool for the model and its implementation.
In the following, four tables (matrices) are presented showing:
 the agent class balance sheet (Table 2), i.e., the asset and liability entries of each particular agent type;
 the sectorial balance sheet (Table 3), i.e., the assets and liabilities aggregated over a sector (all agents
belonging to the same class), which sum to zero with their counterparts in other sectors;
 the cash ow matrix (Table 4), i.e. the monetary ows among sectors, both in the current and capital
account;
 the revaluation matrix (Table 5), which provides the information about sectors' net worth (equity)
changes between periods.
It is worth noting that in the sectorial balance sheet (Table 3), columns report the aggregated balance
sheet of each sector, whereas along the rows we can identify the relations among sectors by spotting the
liabilities (with minus sign) in one sector and the corresponding claims, i.e. assets (with plus sign), in another
sector, thus generally summing up to zero. Exceptions are: the capital goods accumulated by rms and by
the renewable power producer; inventories; housing units and equity shares10 owned by households.
Furthermore, in the last column of the sectorial balance sheet (Table 3). the dierence between central
bank liquidity (an asset) and central bank at money (a liability) is named MCB;0, to emphasize that this
dierence is equal to the initial central bank liquidity and then is constant over the simulation. Fiat money
is the money created by the central bank to provide loans to commercial banks, when they are in liquidity
shortage, or to buy government bonds in the secondary market, through quantitative easing operations.
Households, that sell government bonds to the central bank, deposit the sale proceeds at their own banks,
10We assume that equity shares in households portfolio do not sum up to zero with the corresponding equity counterpart in
the issuer balance sheet because of the usual dierence between market price and book value.
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while the money lend to banks by the central bank is lent to households or rms, then in turn deposited
again in the banking sector. Therefore, in both cases, the liquidity of the banking sector is increased by
an amount equal to the new Fiat money created. Banks deposit their liquidity at the central bank, then
increasing its liquidity by an amount always equal to the Fiat money originally created. It is worth noting
however that the money supply in the economy can variate independently from the at money created by
the central bank, because it endogenously raises every time a bank grants a new loan or mortgage and it
decreases when the loan or mortgage is paid back.
Furthermore, the monetary ows among sectors are presented in the cash ow matrix (Table 4), where the
current account reports aggregate revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus sign) among sectors, therefore
summing to zero along the rows. The capital account reports the endogenous money creation / destruction
operations by means of borrowing/debt repayment by private agents with banks as well as at money
creation / destruction by the central bank by means of the standing facility with banks or government bonds
purchase (quantitative easing). These operations, along with the current account net cash ows, determines
the liquidity change of a sector.
Finally, the revaluation matrix (Table 5) provides the information about changes in sectors' net worth
(equity) between periods. In particular, agents' net worth dynamics depends on net cash ows in the current
account, physical capital depreciation and price changes in nancial (stocks and bonds) and real (housing
units, capital goods and inventories of consumption goods) assets.
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Table 2: Agent class balance sheets
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh
index : h = 1; : : : ; NHous bnEh;bpEb+
fnEh;f pEf+
nEh;K pEK +
nEh;PP pEPP +
nEh;RP pERP
Gov Bonds: nh;G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption Goods Producer Liquidity: Mf Debt: Df =
P
b `f;b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: Kf Equity: Ef
index : f = 1; : : : ; NFirm Inventories: If
Capital Goods Producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP Inventories: IK
Power Producer Liquidity: MPP Equity: EPP
abbrev.: PP
Power Producer Renewable Liquidity, MRP Equity, ERP
abbrev.: RP Solar panels, nsp
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits :
abbrev.: B Db =
P
hMb;h +
P
f Mb;f +Mb;K
index : b = 1; : : : ; NBank Loans: Lb =
P
f `b;f CB standing facility: Db = `b;CB
Mortgages: Ub =
P
h Ub;h Equity: Eb
Government Liquidity: MG
Outstanding government bonds value :
DG = nG pG
abbrev.: G Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding at money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB
Loans to banks: LCB =P
b `CB;b
Deposits:
Gov Bonds: nCB;G pG DCB =
P
bMb +MG
Equity: ECB
Foreign Economy Liquidity, MFE Equity, EFE
abbrev.: FE
Table 2. Balance sheets of any agent class characterizing the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries in the table have a sub-
script character, that is the index of an agent in the class to which the variable refers. In some cases, we can nd two subscript
characters, where the second one refers to the index of an agent in another class where there is the balance-sheet counter-
part. For instance, Df refers to the total debt of rm f , i.e. a liability, and Lb refers to the aggregate loans of bank b, i.e.
an asset. `f;b (or `b;f ) refer to the loans granted by banks b to rms f . Of course,
P
b Lb =
P
f `b;f represents an aggregate
balance sheet identity, that is veried along the entire simulation. nEh;x represent the number of outstanding equity shares of
agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is given by pEx . The stock portfolio's value of household
h is then computed as:
P
x nEh;xpEx . Government bonds' number and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
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